CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-QUALIFICATIONS

CILAUSE-IMPOSITION

OF ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATIONS BY ARKANSAS CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT THAT DENIED CONGRESSIONAL

CANDIDATES

THE

RIGHT TO APPEAR ON THE GENERAL ELECTION BALLOT IF THEY
SERVED MORE THAN THREE TERMS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OR Two TERMS IN THE SENATE VIOLATED THE QUALIFICA-

TIONS CLAUSES-U.S.

Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct.

1842 (1995).
The debate on the qualifications of members of Congress was
advanced by Edmund Randolph' in the Virginia Resolutions 2 at
the Constitutional Convention.3 With respect to congressional
qualifications, Governor Randolph first proposed that an age requirement 4 should be imposed on the members of the federal legislature.5 The Plan also called for the limitation of congressional
service of members of the first and second legislative branches.6
1 1 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 1765-1895 293-94 (1970). Randolph was then governor of Virginia. 1 id. at
294. He was previously the State's first Attorney General, had held a seat in the
United States Congress, served as the United States' first Attorney General, as well as
the second Secretary of State of the United States. 1 id.
2 THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS PRESENTED TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION ON
MAY 29, 1787 (1787), reprinted in THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 22-24 (Michael Kammen ed., 1986) [hereinafter VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS]. The Plan was generally referred to as the Large State Plan. Id. at 22. The
Virginia Resolution was both the first plan to be introduced at the Convention and
the proposal most comparable to the ratified Constitution. Id. The Plan contemplated a national system of government rather than a mere revision of the Articles of
Confederation. Id. at 22-23. Randolph presented the Plan, which Virginia's delegates
drafted prior to the Convention, on May 29, 1787. Id. at 22.
3 1 THORPE, supra note 1, at 309-11. The initial purpose of the Convention was to
alter the Articles of Confederation to remedy the various problems that faced the
states. 1 id. at 305. The Convention's authority only went as far as submitting their
suggestions to Congress, which would then be considered by each individual state
legislature. 1 id. at 306. The states were not bound by the Convention, pursuant to
their declaration of sovereignty in the Articles of Confederation and their common
understanding that the authority of the federal government was limited. 1 id. at 307.
4 VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS, supra note 2, at 23. Randolph did not prescribe an actual age at this time, but rather left the provision blank. Id.
5 Stephen J. Safranek, Term Limitations: Do the Winds of Change Blow Unconstitutional?, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 321, 350 (1992); see alsoJAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 31 (Norton paperback ed. 1987). On
June 12, 1787, the Convention rejected the age requirement. MADISON, supra, at 106,
107. The Plan also required an undisclosed age qualification for the Senate. Id. at 31.
The age requirement for the Senate was determined to be 30 after the Convention
cast its initial votes. Id. at 115.
6 Safranek, supra note 5, at 350. The first and second legislative branches are now
the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively. Id. The term limit provision for the first branch (the House of Representatives) was first changed to "incapa1171 1
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These proposals set the stage for further debate at the Convention
and were subsequently considered by other plans.
In addition, the Convention considered other qualifications
such as property and wealth." Many delegates, however, expressed
concern over both the needless preclusion of qualified candidates 9
and the numerosity of qualifications.1' As a result, the Convention
ble of reelection for one year," then subsequently abandoned altogether. MADISON,
supra note 5, at 109; Safranek, supra note 5, at 350.
7 Safranek, supra note 5, at 351.
8 Id. On July 26, 1774, George Mason motioned to consider the addition of property as a qualification and to eliminate those who were indebted to the United States
government. MADISON, supra note 5, at 370, 372. Mr. Mason suggested the latter
because those who owed the government money might use their office to circumvent
their debts by passing laws advantageous to themselves. Id. at 372. He then suggested
that the Convention adopt the qualifications used by Great Britain. Id. at 373.
Governor Morris opined that eliminating those who owed debts to the government was improper. Id. Morris reasoned that those who owed money had unsettled
accounts mostly due to the fault of the government. Id. Further, Morris responded to
Madison's suggestion that those who received public funds and failed to account for
them should be excluded. Id. Morris illustrated the evil in adopting Madison's
standard:
The Proposed regulation would enable the [Government] to exclude
particular persons from office as long as they pleased[.] He mentioned
the case of the Commander in Chief s presenting his account for secret
services, which he said was so moderate that every one was astonished at
it; and so simple that no doubt could arise on it. Yet had the Auditor
been disposed to delay the settlement, how easily might he have effected it, [and] how cruel [would] it be in such a case to keep a distinguished [and] meritorious Citizen under a temporary disability [and]
disfranchisement.
Id at 373-74.
Madison affirmed Mr. Mason's suggestion to employ the qualifications used by
Great Britain. Id. at 373. However, Madison thought that the qualifications should be
remodeled to include that qualification to which Morris objected. Id. Madison defended the inclusion of a qualification that excluded those who received public funds
and did not account for them based on past cases of men seeking legislative seats with
baleful intentions to cloak their financial improprieties. Id.
Madison also addressed the inclusion of property as a qualification. Id. at 375.
The requirement of a small amount of property would be of no moment, Madison
pointed out, while a criterion of a substantial amount would disqualify legitimate candidates. Id. Further, many wealthy people, namely those engaged in commercial and
manufacturing enterprises, did not hold their wealth in the form of property. Id.
Nevertheless, at the end of the day, the Convention determined
[t]hat it be an instruction to the committee, to whom were referred the
proceedings of the convention for the establishment of a national government, to receive a clause or clauses, requiring certain qualifications
of property and citizenship, in the United States for ...the members of
both branches of the legislature of the United States.
Id. at 384-85.
9 See supra note 8 (discussing the concerns of Madison and Morris in imposing
qualifications that would preclude the service of talented citizens).
10 Safranek, supra note 5, at 351. Regarding a recitation of the proposed qualifica-
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resolved to only adopt qualifications of age, residency and citizenship.' These qualifications were expressly incorporated into the
Constitution
at the Convention, giving birth to the Qualifications
2
Clauses.1

In a recent decision interpreting the scope of the Qualifications Clauses, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,'3 the United States
Supreme Court examined the validity of an amendment to the
Constitution of the State of Arkansas imposing term limits on their
federal legislators. 4 The Thornton Court, relying on the rationale
of the Supreme Court's previous decision in Powell v. McCormack5 ,
affirmed the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court 6 and held
tdons, Mr. John Dickinson opined that "[i]t was impossible to make a compleat [sic]
one, and a partial one [would] by implication tie up the hands of the Legislature
from supplying the omissions." MADISON, supra note 5, at 374.
11 Safranek, supra note 5, at 351. The Convention's list of qualifications for the
House of Representatives stated:
Every member of the House of Representatives shall be of the age of
twenty five years at least; shall have been a citizen in the United States
for at least three years before his election; and shall be, at the time of
his election, a resident of the State in which he shall be chosen.
MADISON, supra note 5, at 386. The Convention's final qualifications for the Senate
paralleled the House requirements, stating that:
Every member of the Senate shall be of the age of thirty years at least;
shall have been a citizen in the United States for at least four years
before his election; and shall be, at the time of his election, a resident of
the State for which he shall be chosen.
Id. at 387.
12 Safranek, supra note 5, at 352. The Qualifications Clause for the House of Representatives, in its finalized form, states that:
No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained the Age
of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States,
and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which
he shall be chosen.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. Similarly, the Clause governing the qualifications for
Senate service require:
No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of
thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who
shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall
be chosen.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, c. 3.
13 115 S.Ct. 1842 (1995).
14 Id. at 1845. The grant of certiorari in Thornton allowed the Court to consider,
for the first time, the issue of whether the Qualifications Clauses were textually finite
or whether the Tenth Amendment reserved some power to the states to add or alter
the qualifications of its federal representatives. See id. at 1847, 1852 (reviewing the
historical context of term limits and contrasting prior Supreme Court jurisprudence
with the distinct issue presented in Thornton).
15 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
16 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349 (Ark. 1994).
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that Amendment 73 of the Arkansas Constitution 17 was an im8
proper expansion of the Qualifications Clauses.'
The genesis of Thornton began when respondent, Bobbie Hill,
filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Pulaski County, Arkansas9 The complaint sought a judicial determination that Section
3 of Amendment 73 violated the Federal Constitution.2 0 The circuit court agreed with respondent and held that Section 3 of the
Term Limit Amendment violated the Qualifications Clauses of the
United States Constitution because the Clauses contained a finite
list of congressional qualifications. 1
In a 5 to 2 decision, the Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld
17 Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1845. The voting citizens of Arkansas ratified Amendment 73 at the general election on November 3, 1992. Id. The proposed amendment, titled "Term Limitation Amendment," provides that:
The people of Arkansas find and declare that elected officials who remain in office too long become preoccupied with reelection and ignore
their duties as representatives of the people. Entrenched incumbency
has reduced voter participation and has led to an electoral system that is
less free, less competitive, and less representative than the system established by the Founding Fathers. Therefore, the people of Arkansas, exercising their reserved powers, herein limit the terms of the elected
officials.
Id.
The term limits imposed by Amendment 73 affected three categories of elected
representatives. Id. First, Section 1 restricts elected officials in the state executive
branch to two four-year terms. Id. at 1845-46. Next, Section 2 limits the terms of state
representatives to three two-year terms and state senators to two four-year terms. Id.
at 1846. Finally, Section 3, the provision in question in the case subjudice,limits the
terms of the Arkansas Congressional Delegation as follows:
(a) Any person having been elected to three or more terms as a member of the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas shall
not be certified as a candidate and shall not be eligible to have his/her
name placed on the ballot for election to the United States House of
Representatives from Arkansas.
(b) Any person having been elected to two or more terms as a member
of the United States Senate from Arkansas shall not be certified as a
candidate and shall not be eligible to have his/her name placed on the
ballot for election to the United States Senate from Arkansas.
Id.
Amendment 73 also provided that its effective date was January 1, 1993 and was
self-executing. Id.
18 Id. at 1871.
19 Id. at 1846. The complaint was also filed on behalf of the League of Women
Voters of Arkansas and "similarly situated Arkansas 'citizens, residents, taxpayers and
registered voters.'" Id.
20 Id. Defendants named by Hill included both the Democratic and Republican
Parties of Arkansas, President (then Governor) Clinton, and various state officials. Id.
Several parties intervened as defendants including petitioners U.S. Term Limits, Inc.
and Arkansas Attorney General Winston Bryant. Id.
21 Id.
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the lower court's judgment.22 A plurality of the court reasoned
that Section 3 of the Amendment was constitutionally infirm beto alter the qualifications set forth in
cause the states lacked power
23

the Federal Constitution.
24
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari
to resolve two distinct issues.2 5 First, the Court sought to determine whether states could add qualifications in addition to those
already found in the text of the Federal Constitution. 26 Second,
the Court examined whether, if the addition of such qualifications
were found to be constitutionally impermissible, Amendment 73's
construction as a restriction to ballot access had constitutional implications. 2 Adopting the rationale of the Arkansas Supreme
Court's plurality decision, the Court held that Section 3 of the
Amendment violated Article I of the Federal Constitution.28
Previously, several state courts had considered the constitutionality of varying state-imposed qualifications. 29 In State ex rel.
Chavez v. Evans, ° the New Mexico Supreme Court confronted the
Hil4 872 S.W.2d at 357.
Id. at 356-57. Justice Brown, writing for the plurality, couched his opinion in
fundamental constitutional reasoning:
If there is one watchword for representation of the various states in
Congress, it is uniformity. Federal legislators speak to national issues
that affect the citizens of every state.... The uniformity in qualifications
mandated in Article I provides the tenor and the fabric for representation in the Congress. Piecemeal restrictions by state would fly in the
face of that order.
Id. at 356.
The plurality also dismissed petitioners' contention that § 3 of the Amendment
simply restricted federal representatives' access to the general election ballot. Id. at
356, 357. Rather, the court noted, § 3 impermissibly burdened federal congressional
incumbents from seeking additional terms. Id. at 357. Justice Brown further criticized petitioner's argument insofar as its proposition that federal delegates could run
as write-in candidates did not have the wherewithal to withstand constitutional assault.
Id.
In addition, two justices concurred with the result of the plurality. Id. at 361.
Finally, two members of the court found that Amendment 73 did not violate the
United States Constitution. Id. at 361, 363. Justice Hays' dissent argued that because
the Constitution did not expressly limit the states from adding additional qualifications to its federal representatives, Amendment 73 was a valid exercise of the power
reserved to the states. Id. at 367. In contrast, Special Chief Justice Cracraft's dissent
proffered that § 3 was merely a permissible ballot restriction measure that did not
even invoke inspection of the Qualifications Clauses. Id. at 368.
24 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 114 S. Ct. 2703 (1994).
25 Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1847.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 1845, 1871.
29 Id. at 1852-53.
30 446 P.2d 445 (N.M. 1968).
22
23
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constitutionality of a New Mexico statute"' that required candidates for the United States House of Representatives to be residents of the district to which they sought election.3 2 In a per curiam
opinion, the New Mexico Supreme Court found that the Qualifications Clause3 3 invalidated the state statute. 4 In so holding, the
court deferred to the well-settled principle that the qualifications
35
set forth in Article I of the Federal Constitution were exclusive.
Thus, the court concluded, petitioners should have been certified
to run for Congress irrespective of their failure to meet state-im36
posed district residency requirements.
In a 1950 decision, the Court of Appeals of Maryland interpreted the Qualifications Clauses in a similar manner.3 7 In Shub v.
Simpson, the court decided whether an oath of loyalty imposed by
state statute applied to candidates running for the United States
Congress. 8 The petitioner, a congressional hopeful, 9 maintained
that the state oath requirement' impermissibly imposed an addi31 Id. at 448. According to the court, the statute required that "[elach candidate
for the office of representative in Congress shall be a resident and qualified elector of
the district in which he seeks office." Id.
32 Id. Two of the petitioners in the case, William Higgs and Wilfredo Ernest
Sedillo, were congressional candidates of the People's Constitutional Party from Distrkits 1 and 2, respectively. Id. Sedillo conceded that he was a resident and registered
candidate of District 1. Id. Higgs admitted that on the day of election, he would not
be a qualified representative in the State of New Mexico. Id. Also, Higgs acknowledged that although he had recently moved to the State, he planned on keeping his
New Mexico residency and would be a resident on the date of the election. Id.

Petitioners contended that the Qualifications Clause, Article I. § 2, cl. 2, was the
exclusive source of criteria that a candidate for the United States House of Representatives had to meet. Id. Therefore, Higgs and Sedillo argued, the additional qualifications of district residency and qualified residency imposed by the state statute were
invalid. Id.
33 U.S. CONSr. Art. I, § 2, cl. 2. For the text of the aforementioned constitutional
provision, see supra note 12.
34 Chavez, 446 P.2d at 448.
35 Id.
36

Id.

Shub v. Simpson, 76 A.2d 332, 340 (Md. 1950).
Id. at 335. The court determined that the other petitioners, Marshall Jones and
Sam Fox, had moot cases because they subsequently made their affidavits in compliance with the state-imposed qualification rather than take appeal. Id. However, the
oath requirement applied to Shub because he was a candidate to a state, rather than a
federal, office. Id.
39 Id. at 334. Thelma Gerende was a nominated member of the Progressive Party
for the Second Congressional District. Id. at 334-35.
40 See id. at 335 (discussing the Maryland Subversive Activities Act of 1949). The
Subversive Activities Act of 1949 provided, in relevant part:
No person shall become a candidate for election under the provisions
of Article 33 of the Annotated Code of Maryland to any public office
whatsoever in this State, unless he or she shall file with the certificate of
37
38
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tional qualification to those already contained in the Federal Constitution.4 1 Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Marbury found
that the oath of loyalty requirement did not apply to federal candidates to Congress.42 The court concluded that although candidates to the Federal Congress may be required to conform to state
election laws, those laws were invalid when they conflicted with the
Federal Constitution.48
4
In State ex rel. Eaton v. Schmah1,
the Minnesota Supreme

Court decided whether a candidate for the United States Senate
could be excluded from the ballot because he had been convicted

of a felony.4 5 The court, in a per curiam opinion, determined that
the state provisions precluding the federal senatorial candidate's'
name from appearing on the general election ballot did not apply
to candidates seeking federal office.4 7 The court reasoned that
the state legislature did not have the power to alter the federal
qualifications of Congress prescribed in the Federal Constitution."
In another case, State ex rel. Sundfor v. Thorson,4 9 the North Da-

kota Supreme Court considered whether a state prohibition, which
disqualified candidates who lost in the primary election from runnomination required by the foregoing Article 33, an affidavit that he or
she is not a subversive person as defined in this article.... No certificate
of nomination shall be received for filing by any board of supervisors of
elections or by the Secretary of State of Maryland unless accompanied
by the affidavit aforesaid, and there shall not be entered upon any ballot
or voting machine at any election the name of any' person who has
failed or refused to make the affidavit aforesaid.
MD. CODE ANN. art. 85A, § 15 (1951).
41 Shub, 76 A.2d at 335.
42 Id. at 340. The court determined that Article I, § 2, cl. 2 set forth the only
qualifications that a House candidate must meet to be eligible to appear on the State
ballot. Id. Further, the court noted that Congress is the sole judge of the qualifications for its members pursuant to Article I, § 5. Id. Finally, the court noted, Article VI
of the United States Constitution contained its own oath provision that petitioner,
once elected, would have to take before assuming office. Id.
43 Id.
44 167 N.W. 481 (Minn. 1918).
45 Id. at 481.
46 Id. The instant action was instituted to prevent the secretary of state from placing James A. Peterson's name on the general election ballot in June of 1918. Id.
47 Id. After he filed his affidavit of candidacy, Peterson was convicted in a Minnesota federal court of an unspecified felony. Id. Pursuant to the judgment of the
court, Peterson was sentenced to serve time for several years. Id. A state constitutional provision rendered him ineligible to serve in federal office if elected. Id.
48 Id. The court held that the provisions of the state constitution had no bearing
on Peterson because the qualifications of a United States Senator were prescribed by
the Federal Constitution. Id. It did not matter, the court noted, that the state election mechanism's purpose was to further the election of federal officers. Id.
49 6 N.W.2d 89 (N.D. 1942).
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ning in the general election ballot, was a qualification or merely a
In Sundfor, the reregulation under the Federal Constitution.
spondent51 maintained that the provision 52 unconstitutionally precluded the congressional candidate 53 from appearing on the
general election ballot.' Writing for the court, Justice Nuessle first
stated that if the provision at issue were a qualification, rather than
a mere regulation, then the provision could not stand. 5 Based
upon the plain language of the statute, the court found that it was
clearly a qualification; thus, the United States Constitution prevented the state from precluding a candidate who lost in a primary
election from lawfully seeking a congressional seat in the general
election.56
Finally, the Oklahoma Supreme Court explored the issue of
whether a citizen could seek contemporaneous election to the
United States Senate and to the office ofjustice to a state supreme
court in Riley v. Cordell.57 In Riley, the candidate defended his ability to seek both offices on the theory that the finite list of qualifications found in the United States Constitution did not preclude him
from doing so. 58 The court, based upon the interpretation of the
relevant state statute, 59 held that an individual could not endeavor
Id. at 89-90.
Id. at 89, 90. The respondent in the case at bar was Herman Thorson, Secretary
of the State of North Dakota. Id. at 89. The Attorney General, Sundfor, instituted
this action to prevent respondent from certifying a congressional candidate's name
who lost in the primary election. Id.
52 Id. at 90. As quoted by the court, North Dakota's Session Laws of 1939, chapter
141, provided "[t]hat any person who was a candidate for nomination for office at any
primary election in any year and who was defeated for said office shall not be eligible
as a candidate for the same office at the ensuing general election." Id.
53 Id. Charles R. Robertson originally sought candidacy as a member of the Republican Party in the primary election on June 30, 1942. Id. at 90. After losing in the
primary, Robertson then tried to gain a seat in the United States House of Representatives by running as an independent candidate. Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 92.
57 Riley v. Cordell, 194 P.2d 857, 858 (Okla. 1948). In a strikingly similar case
decided eight years prior to Ri/ey, the Supreme Court of Arizona had considered
whether a superior court judge could simultaneously run for the United States Senate. Stockton v. McFarland, 106 P.2d 328, 328, 329 (Ariz. 1940). The plaintiff, a Senatorial candidate campaigning in opposition to McFarland, complained that the
Arizona Constitution prohibited state judges from seeking additional offices. Id. at
328, 329. In finding the constitutional provision invalid, the court noted that the
proposition that the Federal Constitution prescribed a fixed set of congressional qualifications bordered on the doctrinal. Id. at 330.
58 RiLey, 194 P.2d at 859.
59 Id. Despite the court's decision to interpret its own state statute, the per curiam
opinion acknowledged Riley's Qualifications Clause contention. Id. The court, as
50
51
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to run for two offices at the same time.6o
In the spirit of the recent struggle to come to grips with a
working concept of federalism,6 1 the United States Supreme Court
recently considered whether states have the power to alter the
qualifications of their federal delegates in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton.62 Specifically, the Court determined whether Section 3
of Amendment 73 of the Arkansas Constitution impermissibly added eligibility requirements to its federal congressional incum6
bents in violation of the Qualifications Clauses. 1
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,' declared that the finite nature of the Qualifications Clauses precluded the states from
altering the requirements for their representatives in the United
States Congress. 65 The Court began its opinion by declaring that
Amendment 73 violated the Federal Constitution.6 6 State-imposed
confinements such as Amendment 73, the Justice observed, were
contrary to the egalitarian principles espoused by the Framers of
the United States Constitution.67 The majority then further stated
that in order for the states to impose additional qualifications on
well as the respondent, conceded that Article I, § 3 of the Federal Constitution did
not permit the states to add qualifications to their federal delegates. Id. However, the
court held that Riley was eligible to run for the Senate but was precluded from seeking election to the bench. Id. at 861-62.
60 Id. at 861. The court reasoned that the two offices were incompatible; if they
could not be simultaneously held, then neither could they be simultaneously sought.
Id.
61 The Court has recently become embroiled in a fundamental versus liberal interpretation of the Constitution, starting with the landmark case United States v. Lopez.
United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).
62 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
63 Id. at 1847. Justice Stevens pointed out that the term "Qualifications Clause"
referred to other constitutional provisions in addition to Article I, § 2, cl. 2 and § 3, cl.
3. Id. at 1847 n.2. For example, Article I, § 3, cl. 7 permits the removal of any federal
officer convicted through an impeachment proceeding. Id. Next, Article I, § 6, cl. 2
prohibits a person holding an office of the United States from simultaneously holding
membership in either the United States House of Representatives or Senate. Id. In
addition, § 3 of Amendment XIV precludes from office any person who previously
took an office of the United States and engaged in "'insurrection or rebellion"'
against the United States. Id. Further, the Guarantee Clause of Article IV and the
oath provision of Article VI, cl.3 are considered qualifications as well. Id.
The Justice also noted that the Court would not determine whether the aforementioned constitutional provisions comprise qualifications because the issues in the
case sub judice did not require that resolution. Id.
64 Id. at 1845. Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Stevens in the majority opinion. Id.
65 Id. at 1854, 1866.
66 Id. at 1845.
67 Id. The Court observed that the proposition that the people had the power to
elect whom they chose to represent them stemmed from fundamental democratic
principles. Id. Further, the Justice noted, disparate treatment of congressional repre-
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their federal delegates, they would have to do so by federal constitutional amendment. 68
After a synopsis of Thornton's procedural history,69 the Court
articulated two distinct issues that needed resolution in order to
assess the validity of Amendment 73.7o Justice Stevens stated that
the first issue was whether states could add qualifications to those
already found in the text of the Federal Constitution. 71 The second issue, the majority asserted, was whether construing Amendment 73 as a restriction to ballot access had constitutional
implications, assuming that the addition of qualifications by the
states was constitutionally impermissible. 72 The Court concluded
that the determination of whether states could impose additional
qualifications on their federal representatives hinged upon the resolution of the issue considered in a prior Supreme Court decision,
Powell v. McCormack.7 1 The Justice consequently grounded the
Court's reasoning on whether the Constitution empowered Congress to judge the criteria of its own members.74
The Justice then began a detailed analysis of the reasoning in
Powell.7' The majority examined the Powell Court's reliance on history and considered the experiences of both the British Parliasentatives by the several states by the imposition of varied qualifications would upset
the federal legislative unity that the Framers contemplated. Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1845-47. For a discussion of the procedural history of Thornton, see supra
notes 14-28 and accompanying text.
70 Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1847.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 489 (1969)).
74 Id.
75 Id. Justice Stevens posited that because the Powell Court thoroughly examined
the historical background of the Qualifications Clauses, that analysis was crucial to
resolve the issue in the instant case. Id. at 1848.
First, the Court described the issue in PowelL Id. In November of 1966, a New
York district elected Adam Clayton Powell to the 90th Congress. Id. After his election, Powell faced charges by fellow members of congress that he had engaged in
improprietous conduct while in office during the 89th Congress. Id. Subsequently, a
congressional committee found that although Powell met the qualifications of age
and residence set forth in the Constitution, his diversion of funds and filing of false
financial statements was unbecoming of a congressman. Id. As a result, the committee excluded Powell as a member of the House and announced that his seat was vacant. Id. Consequently, Powell and several voters from his district sought a judicial
determination of whether Congress' actions invalidating his election was constitutionally impermissible in violation of the Qualifications Clause. Id. Powell reasoned that
Article I, § 2, cl. 2 contained a finite list of qualifications for membership in the
House of Representatives. Id. The Powell Court held that Congress did not have the
power to exclude any person properly elected who otherwise satisfied the requirements set forth in the text of the United States Constitution. Id.
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ment 76 and the Framers. 77 Furthermore, the Justice found that the

Powell Court relied on democratic principles to determine whether
Congress could impose qualifications on its own members. 78 The
majority also looked to Powells holding to determine its applica76 Id. Justice Stevens began the Thornton majority's analysis of the history of congressional qualifications by revisiting the Powell Court's examination of the experiences of the British Parliament. Id. Specifically, the Powell majority had focused on
the situation ofJohn Wilkes. Id. at 1848-49.
The Court explained that Wilkes, while serving in Parliament in 1763, published
a critical opinion on a peace treaty that England signed with France. Id. at 1848.
Wilkes was arrested and sentenced to 22 months in prison. Id. The House of Commons subsequently ousted him for libelous publication. Id. Despite the efforts of
Parliament, the people continued to elect Wilkes. Id. Parliament, however, refused
to validate his seat. Id. The House of Commons eventually voted to rescind its prior
resolutions that prevented Wilkes from taking his seat. Id. The House reasoned that
the previously adopted measures acted contrary to the rights of the people who
elected him. Id. Justice Stevens concluded in Thornton that the Framers considered
the Wilkes experience to mean that qualifications for members of Parliament were
fixed and established by the law of the land. Id.
77 Id. at 1849. The Justice noted that the Powell Court began its analysis of the
Framers' debates with the premise that, based on the experiences ofJohn Wilkes, the
Founding Fathers intended that the qualifications of the federal legislature contained
in the Constitution be finite. Id.
Justice Stevens commented that the Powell Court found that the debate surrounding Congress' power to impose a property requirement evidenced the Framers' intent
to fix the qualifications of Congress. Id. James Madison argued, the Justice observed,
that the power to impose property qualifications would give Congress an improper
ability to avoid constitutional requirements. Id. Justice Stevens continued by repeating Madison's explanation that "'[a] Republic may be converted into an aristocracy
or oligarchy as well by limiting the number capable of being elected, as the number
authorized to elect."' Id.
The Justice also noted that the Framers soundly defeated the proposition by Governor Morris that Congress should have carte blanche power to add qualifications of
its members. Id. The consensus among the Framers, Justice Stevens pointed out, was
that a certain class of people might gain control of the legislature and perpetuate the
membership of its own kind by the addition of qualifications. Id.
In addition, Justice Stevens noted that the post-Convention ratification debates
evidenced the Framers' intent that the qualifications of Congress be exclusive. Id.
For example, the Justice observed, Alexander Hamilton addressed the concern of the
Antifederalists that the Constitution was partial to the wealthy:
The truth is that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference apprehended but by prescribing qualifications of property either
for those who may elect or be elected. But this forms no part of the
power to be conferred upon the national government.... The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon
otheroccasions, are defined andfixed in the Constitution, and are unalterableby
the legislature.
THE FEDERALIST No. 60, at 371 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
[hereinafter THE FEDERALIST]; see also Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1849 (quoting Hamilton's
analysis). Thus, the Justice concluded, the significant historical evidence revealed the
Framers' intent that the qualifications of members of the federal legislature be fixed.
Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1850.
78 Id. First, Justice Stevens noted that the Powell Court championed the egalitarian
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tion to Congress' power to add qualifications.79
tenet "'that the people should choose whom they please to govern them.'" Id. The
Justice then advanced that two principles supported this broad tenet. Id.
The first principle, the Court stated, was that everyone could enjoy the opportunity to be chosen as a representative by the people. Id. Madison addressed this democratic tenet, the Court pointed out, when he stated that "'under these reasonable
limitations [enumerated in the proposed Constitution], the door of this part of the
federal government is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive,
whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular
profession or religious faith."' THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 326 (James Madison); see
also Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1850 (quoting Madison's analysis). In addition, the Justice
pointed out, Wilson Carey Nicholas defended the democratic character of the Constitution, saying that it attended to the concern that all should have the opportunity to
be federal legislators by limiting their qualifications to age and residence. Thornton,
115 S.Ct. at 1850-51.
The Justice next addressed the Powell Court's acknowledgement that sovereignty
belongs to the people who, because of their sovereignty, enjoy the right to select their
federal electors. Id. at 1850. Robert Livingston, the Court pointed out, championed
this principle: "'[Tihe people are the best judges who ought to represent them. To
dictate and control them, to tell them who they shall not elect, is to abridge their
natural rights.'" 2 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE CONsTrruTION, at 292-93 (J.
Elliot ed., 1863) [hereinafter ELIOT'S DEBATES]; see also Thornton, 115 S.Ct. at 1851
(quoting Livingston's analysis). Alexander Hamilton also supported this principle:
The true principle of a republic is, that the people should choose whom
they please to govern them. Representation is imperfect in proportion
as the current of popular favor is checked. This great source of free
government, popular election, should be perfectly pure, and the most
unbounded liberty allowed.
2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, at 257; see also Thornton, 115 S.Ct. at 1851 (quoting Hamilton's
analysis).
Thus, Justice Stevens concluded that Powell stood for two propositions. Thornton,
115 S.Ct. at 1851. The Justice first stated that from a historical perspective, the Framers intended to fix the qualifications of Congress in the constitutional text. Id. Second, the Court noted, the first conclusion is supported by the egalitarian principle
that the people have the fundamental right to choose their representatives. Id. (citing Powe4 395 U.S..at 547).
79 Id. at 1851-52. The Court noted that the holding in Powell, that Congress could
not exclude one of its own members based on Article I, § 5, was not analogous to the
issue of whether Congress could impose additional qualifications. Id. at 1851. The
Justice proffered that the Powell holding did not necessitate such a limited reading.
Id.
A broader interpretation of Powell, as noted by the majority, was evidenced by the
decision reached in Nixon v. United States. Id. (citing Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S.
224 (1993)). The Nixon Court, after stating that the requirements found in Article I,
§ 2 were exclusive and outside the scope of Congressional power to change, explicated that:
Our conclusion in Powell was based on the fixed meaning of
"[q]ualifications" set forth in Art. I, § 2. The claim by the House that its
power to "be the judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of
its own Members" was a textual commitment of unreviewable authority
was defeated by the existence of this separate provision specifying the
only qualifications which might be imposed for House membership.
Nixon, 506 U.S. at 237.
In Thornton,Justice Stevens concluded that the holding of Powell-that Congress
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The holding in Powell, Justice Stevens acknowledged, did not
control whether the states could alter the textual requirements
found in Article 1.80 The Court, before considering petitioners' argument that Powell did not prohibit the imposition of additional
qualifications on federal legislators, cited a multitude of jurisprudence that supported the position that states were powerless to do
SO.

81

The Justice then considered petitioners' position that because
the Constitution is silent on state-imposed qualifications, Amendment 73 is permissible as a valid use of the reserved powers held by
the states.12 This opinion, the Court posited, was invalid for two
reasons.8 3 First, the majority stated that the states never had the
ability to alter the qualifications of their federal legislators.8 4
Therefore, Justice Stevens continued, the Tenth Amendment did
not reserve that power to the states.8 5 Second, the Court advanced,
cannot alter the qualifications of its own members because they are constitutionally
finite-remained on firm ground. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1852.
80 Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1852.
81 Id. at 1852-53. The Court stressed that petitioners did not cite to a single case in
which a court found the imposition of qualifications on federal legislators by states
permissible. Id. at 1852. Justice Stevens further noted that commentators before Powel were likewise in accord with the rationale of the courts. Id. at 1853.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1853-54.
84 Id. at 1854. The Court posited that, contrary to petitioners' assertion, the Tenth
Amendment only reserved powers that the states originally possessed. Id. Because
the states did not have the power to add qualifications initially, the Justice explicated,
the Tenth Amendment did not have the ability to reserve that right. Id. The Court
noted that Justice Story had recognized that "'the states can exercise no powers whatsoever, which exclusively spring out of the existence of the national government,
No state can say, that it has
which the constitution does not delegate to them ....
reserved, what it never possessed.'" I J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES § 627 (3d ed. 1858) [hereinafter STORY].
85 Id. The Court explained that ChiefJustice Marshall, in McCulloch v. Matyland,
supported the position that states could only reserve powers that they had originally.
Id. (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)). The McCulloch
Court rejected the contention that because the Constitution was silent on the subject
of a state's ability to tax, the states reserved that power. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
at 430. The McCulloch Court reasoned that the power of the states to reserve the right
to tax was never invoked because it never possessed that ability. Id.
Next, Justice Stevens pointed out that the states did not possess the power to set
congressional qualifications prior to the ratification of the Constitution. Thornton,
115 S. Ct. at 1855. The Court noted that the Framers contemplated a uniform state
alliance in which the federal officers answered not to the people of their resident
states, but to the people of the several states. Id. The Justice then analogized the
election of members of Congress to that of the President. Id. Quoting Justice Story,
the Court reasoned that the states had no more right to set the requirements of members of Congress than they had for the President because they were both federal officers. Id.
Further, the Court cited to several Constitutional provisions, which evidenced the
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assuming that the states had some original power to alter congressional qualification*s, the Founding Fathers divested the states of
that ability by including a finite list of requirements in the
86
Constitution.
The Justice pointed out that several sources not discussed in
Powell evidenced the preclusion of state power to alter qualifications. 8 7 The first piece of evidence, the Court observed, came from
the Constitutional Convention debates. 88 Next, the majority cited
states' inability to assert reserved powers where none existed before. Id. First, the
Justice observed, Article I, § 5, cl. 1 gives the representatives of the people of the
several states the ability to determine the criteria for membership from any one state.
Id. Next, the Court continued, Article I, § 6 provides that federal law dictates congressional salaries, which are paid out of the United States Treasury, rather than the
states. Id. Thus, Justice Stevens determined that the federal representatives owed
their loyalty to the people of the Nation, rather than to the citizens of their resident
state. Id. Finally, Article I, § 4, cl. 1 and Article II, § 1, cl. 2 indicate that when the
Framers intended the states to exercise power in an area they did not originally possess, the Founding Fathers specifically delegated that authority to the individual
states. Id. at 1855-56.
86 Id. at 1856.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1856-60. The majority first observed that Madison confronted the issue of
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives in the Federalist No. 52.
Id. at 1856. Madison pointed out, the Court noted, that the Constitution limited the
states' ability to determine the qualifications of its congressional delegates insofar as
the criteria had to be synonymous with those of its state representatives. Id. However,
the Justice observed, Madison cautioned that the states were constitutionally precluded from determining the standards of those already elected. Id. The majority
determined that the Federalist No. 57, also evidenced Madison's conviction that states
could not control the criteria of its federal representatives by preventing the imposition of extraneous qualifications, which would "fetter the judgment or disappoint the
inclination of the people." Id. at 1857 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (James
Madison)).
The Justice found further evidence in constitutional provisions discussed at the
Convention debates that states did not have the authority to impose qualifications. Id.
First, the Court looked to the constitutional provisions that regulated federal elections. Id. Article I, § 2, cl. 1, Justice Stevens noted, prevents states from discriminating against their congressional representatives by requiring states to impose the same
qualifications on their federal and state electors. Id. Next, the Court continued that
Article I, § 4, cl. 1 checks the ability of the states to govern the "Times, Places and
Manner of holding Elections" by granting Congress the power to change the state
laws. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1).
The Justice next examined the implications of the congressional salary provision.
Id. at 1858. Madison contended, the Court continued, that placing the power to determine the salaries of federal electors in the hands of the states would lead to inappropriate dependence by Congress on the individual states. Id. The majority
concluded, despite the dissent's position to the contrary, that "it is inconceivable that
the Framers would provide a specific constitutional provision to ensure that federal
elections would be held while at the same time allowing States to render those elections meaningless by simply ensuring that no candidate could be qualified for office."
Id.
Further, the Justice considered Article I, § 5, cl. 1. Id. at 1859. The Court
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to congressional experience as an indication of the states' inability
to enact qualifications.89 Further, the Court looked to democratic
principles for additional evidence.9" The Justice finally determined that state9 1 practices of assessing congressional eligibility were
not persuasive.

The majority subsequently rejected petitioners' position that
Amendment 73 was constitutionally valid because it did not add
pointed out that this provision gave Congress the authority to determine the criteria
of its own members, which was consonant with the understanding that the Constitution contained a finite list of congressional qualifications. Id. It was inconsistent, the
majority observed, to then say that the states could change those requirements. Id.
Finally, the Court found that the dearth of evidence from the Constitutional
Convention that no one advocated the view that states could add qualifications lent
further support to the majority's contention. Id. During the debates, the Justice
noted, Robert Livingston addressed the proposal to add rotation as a requirement;
"[t]he people are the best judges who ought to represent them. To dictate and control them, to tell them whom they shall not elect, is to abridge their natural rights.
This rotation is an absurd species of ostracism." Id. at 1860. Thus, the Court
concluded,
[I]f it had been assumed that states could add qualifications, that assumption would have provided the basis for a powerful rebuttal to the
arguments being advanced. The failure of intelligent and experienced
advocates to utilize this argument must reflect a general agreement that
its premise was unsound, and that the power to add qualifications was
one that the Constitution denied the States.
Id.
89 Id. at 1861. The majority recognized that Congress had historically limited its
ability to scrutinize the criteria of its members by looking to those qualifications fixed
in the Constitution. Id. Specifically, the Justice observed, Congress' experience with
William McCreery lent support to the absence of state power to add qualifications. Id.
Congress found, the Court continued, that a state-imposed residency requirement,
which made McCreery ineligible for his congressional seat by state standards, was invalid because the finite nature of qualifications in the Constitution precluded the
states from legislating in that area. Id.
90 Id. at 1862-64. First, Justice Stevens began, the ideal espoused by the Framers
that people of all merit were eligible for federal election to the Congress evidenced
that the ability of states to alter qualifications of their federal delegates would run
contrary to the intent of the Founding Fathers. Id. at 1862-63. Next, the Court continued, a feature of the people's sovereignty was that they could vote for candidates of
their own choice. Id. at 1863. Further, the majority advanced, the imposition of state
qualifications was contrary to a third egalitarian tenet: that the people enjoy the right
to select their federal representatives, not the states. Id. Finally, the Justice observed,
the imposition of varied qualifications did not correspond to the Framers' vision of a
uniform national legislature. Id. at 1864.
91 Id. at 1864-66. Petitioners argued, Justice Stevens observed, that state practice
after ratification of the Constitution indicated that the states possessed the ability to
add qualifications. Id. at 1864. The Court disagreed, however, reasoning that state
practice was not a reliable yardstick to measure constitutional compliance. Id. Further, the Justice indicated that no court had ever upheld the imposition of state qualifications on federal representatives. Id. Finally, the majority concluded that despite
extensive support, none of the states tried to impose additional criteria on their congressional representatives. Id. at 1866.
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qualifications.9 2 In addition, the Justice dismissed petitioners' argument that Section 3 of the Amendment was merely a restriction
on the "Times, Places, and Manner of Holding Elections."" The
Court also addressed the dissent's contention that the Federal Constitution did not prohibit the Arkansas measure.9 4
Last, Justice Stevens considered the constitutional implications
of rotation.9 5 The Court held that the addition of this power to the
92 Id. at 1866-71. The petitioners advocated the position, the majority observed,
that the amendment was valid because it did not preclude congressional incumbents
from reelection as write-in candidates and therefore was not an absolute bar to reelection. Id. at 1867. TheJustice dismissed the petitioners' narrow interpretation of Storer
v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974), noting that "[c]onstitutional rights would be of little
value if they could be ... indirectly denied." Id. (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649, 664 (1944)). The majority further reiterated that "[t]he Constitution 'nullifies
sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes' of infringing on Constitutional protections." Id. (quoting Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939)). The Court continued
that Amendment 73 attempted to alter qualifications that it could not constitutionally
do otherwise. Id.
93 Id. at 1867, 1868-69 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1). A necessary result of
petitioners' contention, the majority pointed out, was that Congress also had the ability to create legislation similar to Amendment 73. Id. at 1869 (citing Smiley v. Holm,
285 U.S. 355, 366-367 (1932) and U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1). This result, Justice
Stevens posited, would have been untenable to the Framers, and therefore could not
stand. Id. Further, the Court advanced that petitioners' expansive view of the Elections Clause did not comport with the intent of the Founding Fathers. Id. The Elections Clause, the Justice noted, was meant to provide the states procedural power, not
the ability to ban certain people from congressional service. Id.
94 Id. at 1870-71. The Justice recognized that the dissent disagreed with the Court
on two issues. Id. First, the majority observed, the dissent questioned whether
Amendment 73 actually created a qualification. Id. at 1871. Second, the Court noted
that the dissent read the Amendment's intent to " 'level the playing field'" rather than
alter the qualifications set forth in the Constitution. Id. (quoting Thornton. 115 S. Ct.
at 1911 (ThomasJ, dissenting)). As to the former,Justice Stevens explained that the
position that incumbents can run on a write-in basis ignores the reality that Amendment 73 circumvents the constitutional protection afforded to congressional incumbents by Article I. Id. As to the latter, the majority proffered, the argument that § 3
of the Arkansas Amendment levels the playing field falls flat in the face of its sole
purpose to hamper the efforts of federal incumbents to achieve reelection. Id.
95 Id. The Court noted that the Framers had previously considered and rejected
the addition of rotation to the Constitution. Id. However, the Antifederalists voiced
concern over the failure to include rotation as a constitutional provision:
Indeed, all the offices of the federal government, including the president, were perpetually eligible for reelection. Rotation in office, a
"truly republican institution," had been abandoned, making the Senate,
some feared, "a fixed and unchangeable body of men" and the president "a king for life, like a king of Poland." The members of the upper
house of the legislature were so closely allied with the executive in so
many important matters that they would become his "counsellors and
partners in crime." Together the president and Senate held all the executive and two-thirds of the legislative power, in treaty-making they
possessed the whole legislative power, and jointly they appointed all the
civil and military officers. It was, as Richard Henry Lee remarked, "a
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states "would effect a fundamental change in the constitutional
framework."96 A radical change such as the one contemplated by
petitioners, the majority posited, could only be accomplished
through constitutional amendment pursuant to Article V.9 7
In conclusion, the Supreme Court stated that Arkansas' imposition of term limits on its federal representatives to Congress was
most formidable combination of power" that could only unbalance the
Constitution. Beside the president and Senate, the House of Representatives, the supposed "democratic branch" of the government, seemed
but a "mere shred or rag" of the people's power, hardly a match for the
monarchical and aristocratic branches. "What have you been contending for these ten years past?" the Antifederalists asked. "Liberty! What is
liberty? The power of governing yourselves. If you adopt this Constitution, have you this power? No: you give it into the hands of a set of
men who live one thousand miles distant from you." Secure in their
ten-mile square these men could easily become as dangerous as the
court of George III once was, for "Congress will be vested with more
extensive powers than ever Great Britain exercised over us; too great...
to intrust with any class of men, let their talents or virtues be ever so
conspicuous, even though composed of such exalted, amiable characters as the great Washington." The elimination of annual elections, rotation, and recall, together with the extensive powers given to Congress,
would make "the federal rulers ... masters, and not servants."
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787 521-22

GORDON S.

(1969).
Several state constitutions implemented the concept of rotation with respect to
elected officials for fear of constraints on liberty and freedom. Id. at 140. Specifically,
"[a] long continuance in the first executive departments of power or
trust is dangerous to liberty," declared the Maryland Constitution, echoing the sentiments of American Whigs; "a rotation, therefore, in those
departments is one of the best securities of permanent freedom." In
Virginia and Maryland, for example, a person elected governor for
three successive years was then ineligible for reelection for four years.
For some rabid Whigs even this degree of rotation was not sufficient.
Charles Lee, who was a kind of American archetype of the Pure Whig,
considered himself "so extremely democratical" that he believed the
Virginia Constitution defective because the eligibility of the governor
for three successive years furnished him "an opportunity of acquiring a
very dangerous influence," and even worse, it enabled "a man who is
fond of office and has his eye upon re-election" to court "favour and
popularity at the expense of his duty." Mandatory rotation of office and
prohibitions on reelection could even be regarded by some Americans
and enlightened foreigners as important constitutional devices for compelling mobility in a deferential society where men too often felt
obliged to reelect their rulers for fear of dishonoring them.
Id.
96 Thornton, 115 S.Ct. at 1871. Justice Stevens commented that the need for national uniformity of qualifications for the federal legislature led to the adoption of
fixed qualifications in the constitution. Id. That decision complied with the Framers'
understanding that once the people of the individual states chose their congressional
representatives, those representatives answered to the people of the several states. Id.
97 Id.
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constitutionally amiss.98 The majority reasoned that the states did

not possess any preconstitutional powers to control qualifications
so as to invoke a Tenth Amendment shield. 9 Moreover, the Court
determined, even if the states did enjoy some original ability to
alter qualifications of their state representatives to Congress, the
Qualifications Clauses evidenced the Framers' intent to usurp that
authority.100
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy explained why the
dissent's reasoning ran counter to basic tenets of federalism.'
First, the Justice contended, the legitimacy of the federal govern12
ment was derived from the people responsible for its formation. 1
Next, the Justice continued that United States citizens had dual
identities: federal and state.103 In addition, Justice Kennedy proffered, the people controlled the United States Government free
from state impediments.10 4 Thus, the Justice articulated that states
did not have the power to interfere with the right of citizens to
select their congressional representatives. 10 5 Finally, Justice Kennedy observed, Amendment 73's purported purpose, to give the
98
99

Id. at 1853-54.
Id. at 1854.

100 Id.

101 Id. at 1872 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
102 Id. The Justice explained that the nature of the government even prior to the
ratification of the Constitution was republican. Id. As John Jay opined, Justice Kennedy observed, the people of the United States had a federal identity and enjoyed the
same rights and privileges as fellow citizens in different states. Id. Further, the Justice
continued that the notion of nationalism continued once the people installed the
Constitution as the supreme law of the land. Id.
103 Id. The Justice identified the duplicity of a national system of government by
articulating that:
Federalism was our nation's own discovery. The Framers split the atom
of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would
have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected
from incursion by the other. The resulting Constitution created a legal
system unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of
government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its
own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it
and are governed by it. It is appropriate to recall these origins, which
instruct us as to the nature of the two different governments created
and confirmed by the Constitution.
Id.
104 Id. at 1873 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Justice opined that McCulloch v.
Maryland stood for the proposition that the federal government acted legitimately in
the scope of its own power without state intrusion. Id. (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 430, 432).
105 Id. The Justice explained that just because the people voted in their states, it
did not follow that their congressional representatives derived their legitimacy from
state law. Id. (citing Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1884)). Further, Justice Kennedy noted, the right of citizens to elect their congressmen stemmed from
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people enhanced control of the Federal Government,
did not
1 6
render it impervious to constitutional scrutiny. 0
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia, declared that no
constitutional provision prevented the states from imposing additional qualifications on their federal representatives. 0 7 This was
based upon the premise, the Justice reminded, that constitutional
silence did not proscribe state action. 108 TheJustice proffered that
the will of the people in their capacity as state citizens, not as
United States citizens, legitimized the Constitution.0 Therefore,
Justice Thomas opined that Amendment 73 could only be invalidated if there was a constitutional provision that denied the state
the right to add to the qualifications of federal delegates." 0
The dissent began by observing that the majority incorrectly
read the Tenth Amendment to disallow states from exercising powers that they did not enjoy prior to ratification of the Constitution.'1 1 Furthermore, Justice Thomas contended, the majority
wrongly concluded that if the states or their citizens had any rethe Constitution and was protected from state and other interferences. Id. (citing
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941)).
106 Id. at 1875 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Justice concluded that the issue was
not whether the Arkansas amendment effected a stronger hold on the national government for the people, but whether the Amendment derived its authority legitimately from a constitutional standpoint. Id.
107 Id. (Thomas, J, dissenting).
108 Id.
109 Id. The Justice explained that the individual states, not the nation as a whole,
were responsible for the Constitution's ratification. Id. With respect to the Tenth
Amendment, the Justice noted, "the people" referred to the people of the states
rather than the people of the nation because the Constitution did not provide a
means by which the collective people of the nation could exercise power. Id. at 187677 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 1877 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
111 Id. at 1877-80 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Justice posited that the majority's
understanding of reserved powers was incorrect because it did not imply that the
people to whom the powers were reserved enjoyed that power previously. Id. at 1878
(Thomas,J., dissenting). The Tenth Amendment was designed, the justice opined, to
allow the people of the individual states to act in areas that the Constitution did not
specifically reserve to the Federal Government, irrespective of whether the states had
that ability prior to the Constitution's ratification. Id. Further, the Justice noted that
the majority focused on the wrong issue. Id. at 1879 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice
Thomas opined that the issue was not whether state independence inherent in the
Tenth Amendment prevented congressional authority in light of its apparent legitimacy evidenced by Article I, but whether Article I prohibited the states from adding
qualifications to their federal electors. Id.
In addition, the dissent advanced, the majority's reliance on McCulioch to support
the idea that states could act in only those areas in which it lawfully acted prior to
enactment of the Constitution was misplaced. Id. The Justice opined that the limited
discussion in McCulloch devoted to the Tenth Amendment simply said that whatever
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served power to alter the qualifications of their congressional representatives, then this was not in accord with the concept of
national sovereignty.1 12 The Justice noted that the majority misconstrued the intent of the Framers in assigning the states authority over the election of federal representatives.' 1 3 The
Qualifications Clauses, Justice Thomas continued, did not restrict
the states from adding qualifications to their federal representatives in Congress. 4
powers the states did not confer to the federal government by way of the Constitution
were reserved to the states. Id.
Also, the Justice continued, the only legitimate authority the majority cited in
support of its Tenth Amendment interpretation was Joseph Story's treatise. Id. at
1880 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out, however, that the Court had
previously determined that Justice Story's interpretation of the Constitution granted
too much power to the Federal Government. Id.
112 Id. at 1881 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Justice observed that the majority arrived at this conclusion based on two reasons. Id. First, theJustice noted, the majority
advanced that because Congress was a creature of the national government, federal
electors owed their primary duties to the people of the nation rather than to their
state constituents. Id. Next, Justice Thomas continued, the majority believed that
because a congressional representative's responsibilities were national in character, it
was not proper to let one state determine the qualifications of that representative. Id.
The Justice contended, however, that the selection of federal electors was a distinct
action of the people of the individual states, not the undivided mass of people that
comprised the nation. Id.
The concurring opinion, the Justice observed, did not accept the dissent's reasoning because the Constitution grants states the right to choose their congressional
representatives. Id. However,Justice Thomas advanced, a grant of power to the states
by the Constitution did not mean that the states exerted federal authority when they
chose their federal delegates. Id.
Next, the Justice opined that the congressional salary provision advanced by the
majority did not necessitate the finding that states could not select their federal electors. Id. at 1882 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Further, it was of no constitutional moment, the Justice contended, that an individual state could not prescribe the
qualifications of the President because neither could a state set qualifications for a
neighboring state's congressional delegate. Id. This fact, the Justice observed, did
not imply that states could not impose qualifications for their own representatives. Id.
113 Id. at 1883 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Justice noted that Article I, § 4 was the
only constitutional provision that the majority could rely on. Id. Nevertheless, Justice
Thomas opined, the Framers' intent in including the Times, Places and Manners
Clause was to ensure that the states did not cause federal elections to cease. Id.
In addition, the Justice observed, the majority's interpretation of Article II, § 1,
cl. 2 did not lend support to their argument. Id. at 1884 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas noted that the Clause had nothing to do with congressional elections
and that it merely provided for the electoral college. Id.
114 Id. at 1885 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justice opined that the
Qualifications Clauses were merely a listing of the minimum criteria that the Framers
thought each congressional representative should possess. Id. The Clauses, the Justice advanced, only limited state power insofar as states could not alter the age, citizenship, and residency requirements of their federal electors. Id. Justice Thomas
stated that the majority's reliance on historical evidence did not import a meaning
beyond what the plain text of the Clauses set forth. Id.
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The Justice then criticized the majority's position that based
upon the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius,115 the Qualifications Clauses were exclusive. 116 Also, the Justice observed, the majority's use of egalitarian principles did not support the view that
states or their citizens17 cannot alter the qualifications of their federal representatives.
115 BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990). The phrase is defined as:
A maxim of statutory interpretation meaning that the expression of one
thing is the exclusion of another. Mention of one thing implies exclusion of another. When certain persons or things are specified in a law,
contract, or will, an intention to exclude all others from its operation
may be inferred. Under this maxim, if statute specifies one exception to
a general rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain provision,
other exceptions or effects are excluded.
Id.
116 Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1886-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Justice explained
that the addition of qualifications by the states did not interfere with the provisions'
intended purpose to guarantee that congressional representatives met certain minimum standards. Id. This conclusion, the Justice maintained, was "buttressed by our
reluctance to read constitutional provisions to preclude state power by negative implication." Id. at 1887 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Further evidence that cautioned the use
of negative implication to curb state authority was found in Article I, § 10, the Justice
pointed out, which precluded states from acting in various areas. Id. Thus, Justice
Thomas deduced that if the Framers intended the Qualifications Clauses to be an
exclusive list, the Founding Fathers would have included an express provision that
precluded state action. Id.
The majority's contention that the Framers intended uniform qualifications for
Congress, the Justice advanced, was without foundation. Id. at 1888 (Thomas, J., dissenting). As Thomas Jefferson observed,
[h]ad the Constitution been silent, nobody can doubt but that the right
to prescribe all the qualifications and disqualifications of those they
would send to represent them, would have belonged to the State. So
also the Constitution might have prescribed the whole, and excluded all
others. It seems to have preferred the middle way. It has exercised the
power in part, by declaring some disqualifications ....
But it does not
declare, itself, that the member shall not be a lunatic, a pauper, a convict of treason, of murder, of felony, or other infamous crime, or a nonresident of his district; nor does it prohibit to the State the power of
declaring these, or any other disqualifications which its particular circumstances may call for; and these may be different in different States.
Of course, then, by the tenth amendment, the power is reserved to the
State.
14 WRrrINoS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 82-83 (A. Lipscomb ed., 1904); see also Thornton,
115 S. Ct. at 1888-89 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Jefferson's analysis).
117 Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1889-94 (Thomas,J., dissenting). TheJustice opined that
the democratic principles set forth by the majority did not necessitate a finding that
states were powerless to impose qualifications on members of Congress. Id. at 1889
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Rather, Justice Thomas stated, the majority's analysis leads
merely to the following conclusions: 1) the Founding Fathers did not want the Constitution to prescribe multiple limitations on congressional membership; and 2) the
Framers wanted to preclude Congress from altering the qualifications of its own members. Id.
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Further, the dissent noted thatJustice Stevens incorrectly analogized Congress' power to add qualifications and the states' ability
to do the same. 11 8 First, the Justice opined, a comparison of the
original and final drafts of the Constitution evidenced the Framers'
intent to make the qualifications for both the House and Senate
nonexclusive. 119 Justice Thomas next observed that the majority's
reliance on other constitutional provisions did not support the position that states or their citizens could not add qualifications.1 "'
Third, the Justice noted, the evidence the majority relied on from
the ratification period did not support the contention that Amendment 73 is constitutionally impermissible in violation of the Qualifications Clauses. 12 1 In addition, the dissent commented that state
The Justice also proffered that Congress did not have the power to add requirements to its own members because the Constitution did not expressly grant the Federal Legislature that power, not because the Qualifications Clauses precluded it from
doing so. Id. However, it did not follow that the Framers intended to prohibit the
states from adding criteria to their federal representatives, the dissenting Justice observed. Id. at 1890 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Also, the Justice noted, there was nothing undemocratic about the citizens of a state who decided to curtail the spectrum of
candidates by their own initiative because their actions did not violate the tenet that
"the people should choose whom they please to govern them." Id. at 1891 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
Even if one accepted the premise that Article I precluded state legislatures from
adding qualifications, Justice Thomas further opined, it did not necessitate finding
that the citizens of the state were likewise prohibited. Id. at 1893 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
1i8 Id. at 1894 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
119 Id. at 1895 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Justice opined that the evidence
pointed to a distinct choice by the Framers that the qualifications for neither the
House and the Senate be fixed. Id. In addition, the dissent advanced, the majority's
contention that the lack of an exclusivity condition in the draft of the Senate Qualifications Clause was due to the Senate's election by the state legislature, conflicted with
the majority's expressio unius rationale. Id. at 1895-96 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 1896-1900 (Thomas, J., dissenting). First, the dissent argued that Article I,
§ 6, cl. 1 was simply a means by which the Framers sought to ensure a competent
federal legislature. Id. at 1896 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Justice next observed
that the legislative history of Article I, § 2, cl. 2 did not provide a basis for the majority's assertion that the Clause protected congressional representatives from discrimination. Id. Third, Justice Thomas continued, the notion that the Framers included
Article I, § 5 in contemplation that Congress would use state law to determine a representative's eligibility was plausible. Id. at 1897-98 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Finally,
Justice Thomas concluded, Article I, § 4, cl. l's "make or alter" standard did not preclude the states from adding qualifications but served the purpose of ensuring that
states would hold elections. Id. at 1898 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
121 Id. at 1900-03 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas first noted that while the
evidence offered by the majority on the ratification debates did not contain proof that
the states could add qualifications, neither did it contain evidence that the states
could not. Id. at 1900-01 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Further, the dissent did not interpret Madison's argument in the Federalist No. 52 to impose a check on the states'
authority to add qualifications to congressional representatives. Id. at 1901 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
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practice during the post-ratification period defeated the majority's
position that the Framers intended the Qualifications Clauses to be
finite.'22 Actions taken by Congress regarding whether to validate
the seat of a candidate who violated state law, the Justice finally
contended, did
not support the invalidation of the Arkansas
23

amendment.

Lastly, Justice Thomas proffered, Amendment 73 did not disqualify incumbents from seeking reelection because they could do
so as write-in candidates. 124 Therefore, the Justice concluded that
the Arkansas amendment did not violate the Qualifications Clauses
insofar as the criteria set forth in the12 Constitution for congressional membership were not exclusive. 1
In a classic battle between conservatives and liberals, 26 the
Thornton Court returned to its old ways of "playing fast and loose
with the constitution. "127 Thornton came shortly after the Court's
decision in United States v. Lopez,'12 in which the Court experienced
a magnificent atavism to a time when the judicial branch interpreted the Constitution in a fundamental manner. 129 Thornton's
majority expressly contradicted the spirit of the Lopez holding by
interpreting the Constitution to say something that it does not affirmatively declare: that states cannot add qualifications to their
122 Id. at 1903-08 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent advanced that several states
added the qualification that in addition to the state residency requirement their congressional representatives also had to reside in the districts from which the people
elected them. Id. at 1903 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Also, the Justice continued, the
majority failed to explain the significance of a provision adopted in several states that
required the federal delegates to have resided in their respective districts for at least
one year. Id. at 1905 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 1908-09 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Justice opined that the actions of
Congress had little probative value in determining whether states could add qualifications or not. Id. at 1908 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
124 Id. at 1909 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent posited that evidence offered
to the Arkansas Supreme Court showed that write-in candidates who were well funded
and recognized by the public were successful in winning votes. Id. at 1910 (Thomas,
J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also noted that one of the primary reasons that the
citizens of Arkansas had adopted Amendment 73 was to remove the advantage incumbents had over nonincumbents so as to "level the playing field." Id. at 1911 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
125 Id. at 1914 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
126 Ted Gest, Term Limits: Detour Ahead, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP.June 5, 1995, at
11, 11. The author described a national movement to impose term limits on federal
legislators as a political battle between liberals and conservatives both in Congress and
the Court. Id.
127 Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 353 (Alaska 1969).
128 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).
129 See generally United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1642-51 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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federal delegates.13 0 Justice Thomas imparted constitutionally
sound advice when the Justice cautioned that the Court should be
reluctant "to read constitutional
provisions to preclude state power
1
13

by negative implication."

What the Thornton majority failed to realize was that the Framers had a limited federal government in mind. The Founding Fathers drafted the Qualifications Clauses as a floor rather than a
ceiling, to assure that candidates for Congress met some minimum
standards of competence. The fear of an overpowered federal government' 32 led the Framers to leave to the states any additional
qualifications rather than nationalize a multitude of congressional
standards. The citizens of this country do not need a constitutional
amendment to impose term limits because the Constitution has no
affirmative barriers to do so.
In United States v. Lopez, the Court boldly went where no
United States Supreme Court in fifty-eight years dared to go. In
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, the majority once again returned
to a loose interpretation of the Constitution that the Founding Fa130 Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1845. Several commentators have made the case for the
constitutionality of state-imposed term limits. See, e.g., Neil Gorsuch & Michael Guzman, Will the Gentlemen Please Yield? A Defense of the Constitutionalityof State-Imposed Term
Limitation, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 341 (1991) (observing that the Framers did not
demonstrate their intent to preclude the state imposition of term limits on members
of the federal legislature just because the Constitution is silent on that issue);
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., A Defense of State Constitutional Limits on Federal Congressional
Terms, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 97 (1991) (noting that there is no constitutional provision
that precludes state assessment of congressional term limits); Safranek, supra note 5
(opining that the courts should leave the term limit decision for the states and Congress to resolve and federal legislators can seek redress from their constituents). But
see Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Are CongressionalTerm Limits Constitutional?,18 HARv. J.L.
& PUB. POLICv 1 (1994) (stating that term limits are unconstitutional to the extent
that they impermissibly add qualifications to an already finite list); Troy Andrew Eid &
Jim Kolbe, The New Anti-Federalism: The Constitutionality of State-Imposed Limits on Congressional Terms of Office, 69 DENY. L. REv. 1 (1992) (declaring that the proper procedure to install federal term limits is through Constitutional amendment).
131 Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1887 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
132 One commentator pointed out that the recent United States Supreme Court
cases Thornton, Lopez, and Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995), indicate that "the
United States [is] about to undergo a significant transformation of the legal relationship between the national government and the states[ ]." Robert F. Nagel, The Future
of Federalism, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 643, 643-44 (1996). See also Timothy M. Phelps,
Judicial Revolution; Recent Cases Slant Towards States, NEWSWEEK, May 29, 1995, at A13
(observing that there were "revolutionary states-rights movements within the court");
Linda Greenhouse, Focus on FederalPower, N.Y. Tmms, May 24, 1995, at Al (noting that
"it is only a slight exaggeration to say that . . . the Court [is] a single vote shy of
reinstalling the Articles of Confederation");John G. Kester, The BipolarSupreme Court,
WALL ST.J., May 31, 1995, at A17 (opining that "(t)he court of 1995 mirrors the court
of 1935, with the politics reversed").
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thers would have found untenable. Consequently, the Court must
carefully forge a path ofjurisprudence to attain the limited central
government that federalism embodies.
Rocco Luisi

